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ABSTRACT
Popular and official representations of the environment in Burkina Faso present soils as
fragile and potentially subject to catastrophic collapse in fertility.  In the cotton growing zone
of southwestern Burkina Faso, researchers and policy makers attribute changes in land cover
and land quality to population growth.  This paper presents evidence questioning the dominant
‘population-degradation narrative’ as applied to Burkina.  We find that farmers are intensifying
their production systems.  While population has led to land scarcity, farmers are responding
to both the resulting uncertainty in land rights and reductions in soil quality by intensifying the
production process.  Investments are used both as a soil-building and a tenure-building
strategy.
But instead of producing an optimistic intensification counter-narrative, we contend
that intensification is a process with social costs.  A more complex intensification narrative
should encompass elements of changing asset distribution, expropriation, and conflict in the
process whereby individuals and social groups vie for land rights and invest in intensified
production processes.
Keywords: Land tenure, Africa, intensification, degradation, environment, Burkina Faso
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Popular and official representations of the environment in sub-Saharan Africa present
soils as fragile and potentially subject to catastrophic collapse in fertility.  These
representations have justified a variety of policies, from draconian land takings to participatory
community land management initiatives.  Burkina Faso is a case in point.  The Burkinabè state
has cooperated actively in donor-financed ‘anti-desertification’ campaigns.  One of the
principal planks of the revolutionary Sankara regime (1983-87) was an afforestation
campaign.  The Compaoré regime (1987-present) has backed a comprehensive land policy
emphasizing local control and participation.  
Population growth is commonly cited as a key causal factor in degradation.  The
recent National Environmental Action Plan (1993:1) notes that: “In modern times these
[traditional] practices have been overwhelmed by population growth.  A burgeoning
population means that there is simply not enough land to leave fallow, with serious
consequences in terms of overutilization of the land.”  In the cotton growing zone of
southwestern Burkina Faso, researchers and policy makers likewise attribute changes in land
cover and land quality to population growth (PNGTV 1989).  It is true that in the span of a
decade population almost doubled, due mostly to large-scale migration from the more heavily
populated and drought-affected north and central regions of the country.  Large reductions in
fallow periods are well-documented in southwestern Burkina (Berger et al 1988; Gray 1999;
Serpantier 1992).  Several authors have asserted that tree densities in farmers’ fields are
declining (Gijsbers et al. 1994; Kessler 1992).
This representation of the relationship between population and the environment as one
of increasing land degradation is not specific to Burkina.  It constitutes a dominant narrative
in the range of population-environment narratives (Cleaver and Schreiber 1994).  The
degradation narrative, repeated frequently and with considerable authority, has become
2conventional wisdom and as such has provided the ‘enabling assumption’ around which
donors form programs (Roe 1995; Hoben 1995).  The degradation narrative has become
important where political actors have discovered environmental constituencies, and
development policy has taken an environmental turn.  Political actors have learned that
packaging development projects with environmental projects can generate broad opportunities
for coalition-building (especially in donor countries).
 In contrast to this degradation narrative, some researchers have advocated
characterizing the relationship between population and environment as one of intensification. 
That population growth may lead to agricultural intensification is not a new idea.  Much of the
theoretical understanding of intensification emerged from Boserup (1965) who argued that
reductions in land availability forced people to develop and adopt new technologies either by
using more labor or more capital per unit area.  In the process of intensification, fallow times
are reduced and cropping frequency increased.  While Boserup focused on population growth
as the main stimulus for agricultural intensification, others argue that markets, credit, services
and government policy are equally important (Lele and Stone 1989; Pingali and Binswanger
1987).  A spate of recent empirical papers offer detailed case studies from sub-Saharan
Africa suggesting that agricultural systems are intensifying, thus sustaining or improving
ecosystems and yields (Tiffen et al. 1994, Netting et al. 1993, Turner et al. 1993).  These
various studies show that with growing population pressure and reductions in fallow times,
farmers are using techniques to substitute for the inability to fallow fields.  Productivity is
frequently augmented or restored with fertilizer, manure, agro-forestry, or cover crops. 
Irrigation, likewise, intensifies production by enabling techniques of more continuous
cultivation across seasons over the year.
Debates about land tenure as a key institution that mediates between population
changes and environmental outcomes have shaped policy and research priorities.  Many
government policy makers and academics continue to believe that communal tenure systems
impede agricultural investment, despite the fact that research has consistently failed to
demonstrate impacts of titling and formal individualization on investment behavior (Migot-
3Adholla et al 1991; Platteau 2000, Sjaastad and Bromley 1997).  This is particularly true for
Burkina Faso, where studies have found no link between tenure status and agricultural
practice (Matlon 1994, De Zeeuw 1997, Braselle, Gaspart and Platteau 1998).   Nevertheless,
the prior belief persists, justified by several ‘self-evident’ arguments.  First, population
growth and increased competition for land are thought to be resulting in uncertain land rights,
which in turn lead to tragedies of the commons.  Farmers clear land in order to lay claim to it,
occupying land not in order to cultivate efficiently but as a way of staking a claim (Brider
1990).  Second, because farmers’ claims are insecure they are hesitant to invest in soil quality
(Faure 1995).  Third, degradation is thought to be especially pervasive among migrant
farmers, who not only have insecure tenure, but are often characterized as being destructive
of agrarian landscapes (Benoit 1982).  
This paper considers evidence on these parallel debates over degradation and tenure
insecurity, as applied to southwestern Burkina Faso.  The data, from surveys conducted in
three villages in the ‘cotton zone’ of southwestern Burkina, supports the alternative narrative
of intensification.  We will show that the more densely populated village has more intensive
production practices, that the supposedly ‘environmentally irresponsible’ migrant farmers are
probably less destructive of the local agro-ecology, and that less secure land status plays little
role in local degradation.  While land area under cultivation has increased at the expense of
forest, farmers are making changes in their management strategies that result in improved soil
quality.  They use manure and fertilizer, rotate crops, leave trees in fields, and build soil/water
conservation structures.
This process of intensification has implications for soil quality, but also for land rights
(Platteau 1995).  By investing in soil quality, farmers are simultaneously building land rights. 
A growing literature puts the individual actor in the dynamic position of creating land rights
through cultivation and investment strategies (Besley 1993, Braselle, Gaspart and Platteau
1998, Platteau 2000).  Burkinabè farmers seem to be quite conscious of how intensification
gradually strengthens rights to land.  The longer one can stay on a field, whether one is a
4local or migrant farmer, the more difficult it is to take the land away and the less authority
lineages and communities have over the field.
Instead of concluding with a happy coincidence of intensification and evolving land
rights, however, we contend that intensification is a process with social costs.  There are
winners and losers.  More specifically, because intensification involves changing land rights
there is essentially a process through which wealthier farmers who have access to inputs
strengthen rights while poorer farmers lose rights to land.  The gradual polarization in rights
exacerbates an already tense political atmosphere, and encourages conflicts over land.  A
more complex intensification narrative should encompass elements of changing asset
distribution, expropriation, and conflict in the process whereby individuals and social groups
vie for land rights and invest in intensified production processes.  These elements are
probably general to the intensification process, and their absence from the usual intensification
narrative is troubling.  They are particularly troubling because this process has
straightforward implications for government policy.  In Burkina Faso, the government has
weakened the principle of individual or household usufruct rights, and relied on informal
mediation to solve conflicts.  This strategy probably ends up further undermining the rights of
poorer farmers or marginalized groups (including women), who cannot sustain continuous
cultivation and who cannot influence the process of informal mediation.  A fairer policy might
reverse this trend, and embrace more security for individual tenure among the most
vulnerable.
2.  DEMOGRAPHIC AND AGRICULTURAL CHANGE IN SOUTHWESTERN BURKINA
FASO  
Over the past two decades, southwestern Burkina has undergone rapid change
associated with population movement, cotton cultivation and animal traction.  Most of the
population growth has come from migration of Mossi farmers from the drought affected
central and northern regions of the country.  When they initially started to migrate in large
numbers in the 1970s, they were welcomed and given land by local Bwa farmers who
5leveraged the growth in population into more political clout at the regional and national level. 
Population growth rates of the zone cotonnière increased much more rapidly than  the country
as a whole, more than doubling from 1975 to 1985.    In recent years, migration has slowed1
down, primarily because local Bwa farmers themselves perceive a land shortage and no longer
easily grant fields to Mossi migrants.  Some villages are experiencing now population
reductions as Mossi migrants continue to move southwards in search of fertile lands in other
parts of the country.
Population change has been accompanied and  followed by large-scale changes in
agricultural practices and technology (Pingali & Binswanger 1987, Nobere 1988, Tersignel
1992; Sanders el al. 1996).   Cotton yields and area under production grew dramatically: from
1980 to 1990 cotton/grain production went from 62,000 to 189,000 tons (Schwartz 1991). 
The emergence of agricultural extension, financial and marketing services were among the
key reasons why cotton production and yields increased during the 1980s.  In 1979, after
CFDT (Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles) partnered with the
government of Burkina  to create a new cotton organization called Sofitex, external donor
resources began to pour into the cotton sector.  The price of cotton increased and agro-
chemical and financial inputs became available.  Grower cooperative associations known as
Groupements Villageois (GV) began channeling short-term loans for fertilizer, seeds and
herbicides.
Animal traction was a key element of this technological package.  Day et al (1992)
estimated that improved animal traction packages could generate up to 45 times more net
farm income for Sahelian households. In 1980, Sofitex began its motorisation intermédiare
program that financed purchase of animals for traction and plows (Schwartz 1991). 
Members of the GV were able to apply for medium-term loans for the equipment and oxen
for animal traction through CNCA (Caisse National de Crédit Agricole).  This led to a rapid
region-wide adoption of animal traction.
While cotton production has propelled the region into one of the wealthiest in Burkina,
it has not been without problems.  Group indebtedness and consequent inefficient political
6negotiations over credit programs and repayments have plagued the program.  This, along
with reliance on expensive inputs with concomitant price and supply risk, and pest-control
failures due to lax regulations and low farmer education, have led to many farmers
abandoning cotton production altogether.  
3.  THREE VILLAGES IN THE COTTON ZONE
We investigate the degradation narrative in the province Tui (formerly Houet), in the
heart of the cotton growing region of southwestern Burkina.  A sample of 106 farm
households were surveyed in three villages- Dohoun, Dimikuy, and Sara- during the 1995-96
agricultural season.  The villages were similar in most regards.  They were approximately 20
kilometers apart down an unpaved cotton road.  They had similar ethnic make-ups; each
village had both local Bwa and Mossi migrant populations.  The sample was selected to
ensure adequate representation of both groups.  Farmers were asked about their agricultural
practices, household demographics and perceptions of environmental change.  Although
much of our data is cross-sectional, by comparing three villages with similar agricultural
potential but with different population densities, we are able to get a glimpse at different
stages of the population-environment nexus. 
[Table 1 about here]
There were large differences in socio-economic indicators among farmers and across
villages and ethnic groups.  Table 1 presents some summary statistics.  Large household
compounds of the past had disappeared; most household consisted of parents and married
son, or a pair of married brothers, with the average number of adults slightly less than five. 
A relatively crude index of animal wealth- constructed by weighting numbers of animals by
average market prices- shows that Mossi tended to invest their wealth much more heavily
into livestock.  The value of animals owned by Mossi was almost three times the value owned
by Bwa.  The investment priorities of the Bwa, however, tended to steer towards education
and housing.  An index of housing stock constructed as the sum of five zero-one measures of
housing investment (in walls, roofs and courtyards) is moderately higher for the Bwa,
7especially in Sara (though not statistically significant for the whole sample because of missing
observations from Dohoun).  Farm assets were not significantly different between the two
groups.  The percent of households owning oxen was very high, ranging from 75% in Sara
and Dimikuy to 40% in Dohoun.  Even the low rate of adoption in Dohoun was quite high for
Burkina at the time.   Most of those who owned oxen owned a pair, and also owned their
own plows.  About half of the farmers owned carts for transporting manure and farm
produce.  The average family cultivated roughly six hectares, often as a single field divided
into separate plots for the different crops.  Mossi were more likely to have two fields.
  Comparing the villages, residents of Dimikuy were wealthier than their neighbors. 
Dimikuy families were larger than the families of the other two villages; Dimikuy households
had double or more the value of livestock; housing investment was higher; and farm capital
was higher.  Farms were bigger. Dimikuy and Dohoun farmers tended to have a single field,
reducing transportation and coordination costs.  The fields of Sara farmers were more likely
to be scattered, primarily because of the difficulty of finding fields in close proximity due to
land scarcity.  (Rainfall in this part of Burkina Faso is fairly heavy and consistent, reducing
the economic incentive to scatter fields.)
Farmers in 1995 were growing cotton and maize on slightly less than half of their
acreage, which averaged around six hectares.  Sorghum, millet, groundnuts and beans were
grown on the rest.  Partly as a consequence of their relative lack of oxen, Dohoun farmers
tended to grow the largest fraction of their land (51%) in sorghum and millet, while the more
prosperous Dimikuy and Sara farmers were able to pursue a fuller range of diversified
production.
4.  SOURCES OF DEGRADATION AND INTENSIFICATION IN THREE VILLAGES 
The Burkinabè population-degradation narrative has three strands which are
intermingled in the discourses of policymakers, government officials and farmers themselves. 
First, population growth is thought to lead to land degradation through fairly direct means-
more people means more land cultivated which in turn leads to less shifting cultivation and
8increased degradation.  The second strand offers a cultural explanation, relating Mossi
traditions of ‘conquest’ to their present attitude toward their natural resource base.  Mossi
migrants in particular are blamed for reductions in fallow periods and soil degradation due to
poor agricultural practices.  Researchers, government officials, and local farmers alike
perpetuate a stereotype of migrant farmers who like to cut down trees (Benoit 1982).  The
final strand of the Burkina narrative is that population growth and land scarcity have led to
uncertain land rights.  Throughout western Burkina, land-holding continues to be based on
usufruct and is regulated through membership in corporate groups.  With continuous in-
migration and changing production patterns, however, land conflicts and uncertainty
regarding rights have become more common.
We examine each component of the Burkinabè degradation narrative- population
growth, Mossi short-sightedness, and tenure insecurity- in turn, by looking at non-degrading
practices such as manuring and tree-presence on fields.  These practices are commonly
associated with intensification, and portend a more sustainable agricultural future.  We also
combine the explanatory variables in a multivariate setting.
(a) Population growth as source and cause of degradation
The primary difference among the villages is in land availability.  The southwest in
general has had low population densities, ranging from 15 to 30 people per square kilometer,
but the densities in the three villages are higher because of the increased migration.  Table 2
presents population densities for the three villages.  Population densities were calculated from
land area data culled from aerial photographs and satellite imagery and from population figures
from the decennial censuses (Morant 1990).  Population essentially doubled in all three
villages between 1975 and 1985, but growth has slowed down as land is not available for
potential migrants.   The densities have been calculated for both total land area and for land
that is considered arable.
[Table 2 about here]
The villages have very different population densities over available land.  Sara has
much a higher population density than the other two villagers.  Land of Sara was taken away
9with the establishment of classified forests, and much of the remainder is on steep slopes and
uncultivable.  Dimikuy’s medium population density can also be attributed to the fact that
much land has also been put into classified forest.  Dohoun, on the other hand, still has an
abundant amount of land available for cultivation.
The much higher population density in Sara was clearly associated with measures of
intensification (the regression analyses below will confirm the statistical significance of these
comparisons).  Table 3 shows that fertilizer use was in general very high; it was applied to
65% of all fields.  Manure use was lower; overall only 20% of  fields were manured, and
20% had animal corralled.  Of the hand-manured fields, four-fifths were also fertilized, and
for those farmers who used manure, the number of sacks used per hectare was positively
correlated (0.26) with the amount of fertilizer used, rather than negatively correlated. Both
fertilizer and manure use were sharply higher in Sara compared with Dohoun, despite the
preference of farmers not to use fertilizer on sloped fields.  Recall that Dohoun had the lowest
incidence of draft animal ownership, and very low levels of animal ownership generally.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 also shows the density of trees on agricultural fields in the three villages. 
Sara, with an average of 18 trees per hectare, had the highest number of trees of the three
villages.  (Incidentally, Sara fields also had the fewest number of stumps, and more trees on
more recently cleared fields, indicating that the higher number of trees are part of deliberate
strategies not to cut down trees.)  Of the trees counted, approximately 75% were karité,  6%
néré, 2% Acacia albida and 17% other types of trees such as tamarind (Tamrindus indica),
caicedrat (Khaya senegalensis) or raisinier (Lannea microcarpa).  Farmers leave many of the
species from the ‘other’ category in their young fields; often they are removed within the first
several years of cultivation.
On some measures, however, there were clear effects of the higher population
density: Sara fields were cultivated longer (though Sara field were not found to have declined
as much in terms of lowered harvests over recent years or heavier weeds- at least not
according to the self-reported descriptions of farmers, and this result is not significant in the
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regression analysis); Sara did have more observed erosion (though its fields were more often
sloped, and this also explains the low frequency of corralled herds on the fields); and Dohoun
had more evidence of anti-erosion measures (an intensive agricultural extension project in
Dohoun explains the difference).
Overall, the data show that intensification was higher in the higher density villages, and
suggests that there is no easy correspondence between population density and land
degradation.
(b) Mossi as source of degradation
Table 3 furthermore shows there is no clear evidence for the perception of Mossi as
adopting more land-degrading practices.  The did not have fewer trees on their fields, nor did
they cultivate their fields longer.  They were more likely to use manure (though less of it than
Bwa farmers who also used manure) and more likely to have anti-erosion investments (though
also more likely to have erosion, partly because of a preponderance of sloped fields among the
Mossi). Most Bwa used fertilizer rather than manure as soil amendment, but when Bwa did
use manure (on only ten fields) they tended to use twice as much manure per hectare as
Mossi. Bwa in Sara had higher densities of trees in their fields than migrants.  In Dimikuy and
Dohoun, however, the relationship was reversed.  Mossi in the two villages had significantly
higher numbers of trees in their fields than did Bwa.   Interviews with farmers confirmed that
they left trees on their fields purposefully.  Dohoun did, however, have the highest incidence
of cattle corralled on Bwa fields depositing manure directly; 72% of the Bwa (only 20% of
the Mossi) responded that their fields were indeed renewed in this manner, many from Peulh
herders.  Again, no obvious correlation between ethnic status and land degradation across the
range of outcomes or sustainable farming practices.
(c) Insecure tenure status as source of degradation
In the three study villages, Mossi and Bwa differed sharply in tenure status, and these
differences in status are closely connected to different levels of insecurity.  Table 4 breaks
down fields according to mode of acquisition.  Mossi fields were all borrowed except for 5%
of the Mossi fields in Sara where cultivators claimed to have inherited their fields.  in general
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Mossi are ‘strangers’ and can have no claim to the mystical ties to land created when an
ancestor opens the bush for the first time.  Nevertheless, land once borrowed is often
difficult to regain, and inheritance from father to son is a powerful principle of the modern
economy that may serve to justify and legitimate claims to land.  It is not surprising then to
find the occasional Mossi claiming to have inherited his land.  There are similar ambiguities in
borrowing; many of the Mossi borrow from their local Mossi sponsor (or tuteur in French)
who has ‘presented’ them to the Bwa inhabitants and allocated them land without going
through- except formulaically- normal Bwa ritual sacrifices.  The incidence of obtaining land
indirectly is increasing; average time in the area for a Mossi who obtains land from a tuteur is
only fifteen years, as opposed to an average of twenty years for those Mossi fields obtained
directly from Bwa.
Normally, a Mossi borrowing a field would be required to present a ritual gift of grain
to the Bwa lineage head controlling the land.  The situation on the ground is more variable:
some Mossi give no grain, others give one tiin (about 10 kg.) and still others, particularly in
Dimikuy where tenure tensions have increased, give two tiin.  In addition to varying by
village, these payments vary in an expected way with source of land and time acquired.  Land
obtained by Mossi from their tuteur is less likely to carry with it the implicit gift of two tiin,
while land obtained directly from Bwa is more likely to carry a high gift.  There has also been
evidence of a trend towards larger gifts.
[Table 4 about here]
 The sources of Bwa fields are also varied.  In Dimikuy and Dohoun, Bwa are most
likely to have obtained their fields through lineage allocation.  A substantial fraction borrow
fields from outside the lineage; the incidence of ‘borrowing’ land within lineages is slight. 
The situation in Sara is different, reflecting higher population density.  As much land is
borrowed as inherited, and a substantial fraction of land is inherited across lineages.
In order to examine the effects of different tenure status, we adopt a multivariate
framework estimating reduced form equations for input demands.  We control for village
(proxying for population density) and field characteristics, as well as the wealth of the
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farmer. A problem with estimating input demand relations concerns the prevalence of zero
values of manure and fertilizer use on fields, and many of the other practices coded as zero-
one values.  We estimate the equations using Tobit and Probit procedures.  The spirit of these
estimates of the determinants of fertilizer and manure use, and tree density, is exploratory (for
econometric investigations using data from other countries see Jha and Hojati 1993; Gavian
and Fafchamps 1996; Savadogo et al. 1994; Hayes, Roth, and Zepeda 1997; Clay, Reardon
and Kangasniemi 1998; and Pender and Kerr 1998).  Table 5 presents the estimated
coefficients for models explaining the various practices described earlier in Table 3.  
Note that given the limitations of the sample and data we are unable to control for the
possible endogeneity of tenure security.  A recent paper that offers an excellent introduction
to the difficult and still unresolved econometric issues at issue is Braselle, Gaspart and
Platteau (1998).  In our case, we are not explicitly measuring tenure rights (which may well
be endogenous) but rather tenure status (e.g. Mossi borrowing from Bwa, or from Mossi
tuteur, etc.).  Status may also be endogenous in that farmers deliberately select who to
borrow land from, or who to lend to.  But given the usual long-term nature of most of these
borrowing arrangements that endogeneity is likely to play less of a role in this specific
situation.
[Table 5 about here]
The regression results confirm the thrust of this section, that major components of the
degradation narrative as applied to Burkina do not apply to the study area.  First, the variables
for tenure insecurity are only significant in a small fraction of the regressions.  These tenure
variable are: moborbwa, whether a Mossi farmer had borrowed from a Bwa lineage; mborfrer,
whether a Mossi farmer had borrowed from a frère or tuteur; and bwabor, whether a Bwa
farmer had borrowed the field.  The omitted category is whether the field was managed by a
Bwa farmer who had inherited.  There are seven dependent variables, and three explanatory
variables having to do with tenure status, for a total of twenty-one possible coefficients.  Of
these, only one is significant at the 1% level, tw are significant at the 5% level, and tw at the
10% level.  This contrasts with the coefficients for field characteristics (slopdum, a dummy
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variable for whether the field is sloped, farfield, a dummy variable for whether the field is
farther away from the village, stony, the percent of the field that is stony soil, and silty, the
percent of the field that has silty soils), which are significant at the 5% or 1% level in 11 of
28 instances, and the coefficient on farmer assets which is significant in 6 of the 7
regressions.
Moreover, even when they are significant, tenure status variables are not necessarily
best interpreted as signifying that insecurity leads to poor practices.   In the regression
explaining manure and fertilizer use, the tenure variables for the Mossi have similar
coefficients, and are basically proxying for the Mossi ethnic group as a whole, excluded in
general from the formal structure for obtaining fertilizer and hence resorting to more manure
use.  In the probit equation explaining whether erosion was observed to be a problem, this
may be more an indication that more recent Mossi arrivals are given, by their tuteurs, already
eroded land.
Second, the village of Sara, the most densely populated, is associated with better
practices (trees, fertilizer) in two cases, and with worse practices (animals corralled, anti-
erosion investment) in two cases.
Third, as suggested above, and confirmed by regressions with only dummy variables
for ethnicity instead of the tenure variables, there is no justification for the idea that Mossi
have different practices from Bwa.  In those regressions, the ethnic dummies follow the basic
direction of practices for the ethnic groups established in Table 3.
Finally, the regressions are most consistent in revealing that the level of household
assets  is a significant determinant of intensification practices.  Wealthier farmers apply more
manure and fertilizer, they corral animals on fields, they adopt anti-erosion techniques, and
they farm fields for longer periods.
5.  ALTERNATIVE INTENSIFICATION NARRATIVES
Population growth and technological change have resulted in land scarcity in the study
area.  This in turn has propelled farmers to begin a process of intensification, applying more
14
inputs to land and sustaining output without significant soil degradation.   In many regards the2
study area is similar to others described through Africa where processes of intensification are
also underway.  Tiffen et al. (1994) find that Machakos district in Kenya has more trees and
less erosion as population and household incomes have increased.  Turner et al. (1993)
demonstrate these relationships in a number of case studies of agricultural growth and
intensification in sub-Saharan Africa.  In most of the case studies of populations over 200
people/square kilometer, farmers have fairly intensive agricultural systems.  Netting et al.
(1993) have documented the process by which Kofyar farmers have responded to
demographic pressures by intensifying their agricultural production through the use of bio-
chemical inputs.  Simulation studies predict similar processes.  Barbier (1998), for example,
conducted a simulation exercise of a typical Burkina village in the cotton zone, subject to
population growth, and found that intensification was the profitable strategy (though).  These
studies typically offer optimistic counter-narratives explaining the intensification process
(though Barbier predicts declining welfare as soil quality deteriorates even with
intensification).
The usual intensification narrative neglects an alternative that is not so optimistic.  As
we have seen, adoption of intensification practices depends on assets (i.e. wealth).  This has
an important and neglected effect: since intensification facilitates continuous cultivation, and
continuous cultivation changes land rights, a subset of wealthier farmers are developing new,
more secure rights to land.  Poorer farmers who have to abandon fields because they cannot
sustain cultivation through intensification become less and less secure in their tenure rights. 
Most studies of intensification do not mention this process.  Barbier, for instance, implicitly
assumed that every villager’s tenure rights were secure, and so assumed that intensification
benefits were divided up evenly among village residents according to their landholding.
Farmers across the three villages agreed that continuous cultivation, irrespective of the
source of land, was a necessary and perhaps even sufficient condition for secure tenure.  A
field was generally secure while an individual cultivated it, but as soon as it was left fallow, a
process of competition for that land began, a process in which an individual’s status was key
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in determining whether that individual would be able to maintain rights to it during the fallow
period.  The ability to maintain control over fallow land depended on several factors: whether
that land was borrowed or inherited; whether it belonged to one’s lineage; ethnicity; length of
time of cultivation of that parcel; and the social and economic status of competitors for land. 
Only migrant farmers who had resided in the area for a long period and who had developed
ties of marriage or friendship said they could be confident in leaving land fallow.
Almost all Mossi farmers in the sample stated that would not leave land fallow for fear
that it would be taken away from them. A Bwa farmer in Sara expressed a sentiment
common to both Bwa and Mossi alike:  “A Mossi farmer will never leave a field fallow
because they are afraid of having it taken away.”  For the Mossi, the threat of losing land left
fallow was seen as a deliberate political strategy of the Bwa.  In their view, Bwa youth had
pushed their elders to encourage Mossi out-migration.  This ‘encouragement’ took three
forms: taking fallow land back; only giving old and infertile fields to resident Mossi who
requested new fields; and denying fields to new Mossi migrants. 
More and more, this problem applied to local Bwa farmers as well, who were also
hesitant to leave land fallow.  They feared that relatives would ask to use the land, requests
which  which they might have little choice but to fulfill.  One Bwa farmer in Sara counted
over seven requests for his land from both Bwa and Mossi farmers in the two years it had
been left fallow.  He was easily able to deny Mossi requests, but not easily able to decline
requests from Bwa kin and friends.
Maintaining access to land required farmers to pursue strategies of continuous
cultivation, which could be effective regardless of the initial tenure status of the field 
(borrowed or inherited, migrant or local).  Thus at one extreme the wealthiest Mossi farmer
in Dimikuy had planted mango trees on one of his fields, an act expressly prohibited by the
Bwa.  His wealth and standing in the community made him immune to normal restrictions
concerning land.  A more common strategy used by farmers was to leave a portion of a field
in fallow, while cultivating the remainder.  By not abandoning the field completely, farmers
could assert control over the entire field.  Several Mossi farmers applied manure to plots left
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fallow within larger fields, thus improving the quality of the fallow.  The strategies of farmers
in the three villages were similar to those described elsewhere.  Matlon (1994), finds that in
Burkina manure application is higher on plots that are borrowed non-lineage lands than on
plots borrowed from lineage land.  He speculates that farmers may use manure to prolong
cultivation, increasing their ability to farm land in situations where tenure security is marginal. 
More generally, the assertion that there is a relation between agricultural investment and land
rights has been made in Besley’s (1993) study of tree planting in Ghana and Braselle, Gaspart
and Platteau’s (1998) study of land investment in Burkina.  These demonstrate that tenure
becomes more secure through the act of planting trees and other investments.  Land rights
are endogenous; the evolution of land rights and economic investment in agriculture occur
simultaneously.
We have seen above that wealth was a key determinant of whether farm households
adopted intensification techniques.  This implies that the process of intensification will be
uneven in terms of distribution.  If wealthier farmers intensify and gain more secure land
rights, poorer farmers are the ones who gradually lose tenure rights because of their inability
to maintain their investments in land.  Tallent (1997) warns of this process in southwestern
Burkina, as does Lund (1998) in a study of farming in northern Burkina.
This uneven process opens the door to costly conflict, as poorer and land-short
farmers (particularly the young) use political discourses (infused with the language of
ethnicity) to halt incipient processes of intensification and ‘privatization’.  Land scarcity has
indeed led to open conflict over land.  In Sara, for example, Bwa farmers have expelled Mossi
migrant farmers from an entire village area.  Bwa farmers in an attempt to regain land that had
been long settled by Mossi used threats of violence.  Groups of young men with guns went
door to door to warn Mossi who were cultivating there to leave “or else”.  In the end, though,
it was not overt violence but sorcery that convinced Mossi farmers to abandon their fields. 
Stakes were placed in Mossi fields, which were translated by most Mossi farmers as “you
had better leave or you will die”.  In local cosmology, land is controlled by the ancestors who
watch over the actions of the living.  It is widely perceived that they will intervene if they
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sense that people are not respecting the land.  Bwa farmers argued that the evictions were
just; Mossi farmers moved into the area without permission and had not conducted the proper
rituals.  By early 2000, four years since Mossi left their land and despite official decisions on
their behalf, most were unwilling to return for fear of revenge from the “ancestors”.  Many
had left Sara and migrated to southern Burkina near the Côte d’Ivoire border.  
In Dimikuy, a project to reorganize land holdings based on the Gestions des Terroirs
Villageois (Painter et al., 1994) model broke down after Bwa villagers used the rhetoric of
sustainable land management to advocate evicting Mossi farmers from the village.  They
invoked the stereotype of Mossi farmers who like to cut down trees as justification for asking
Mossi villagers to leave the village.   Conflicts between young and older Bwa also surfaced as
younger villagers accused their elders of giving away their land for payment.  The leaders of
the reorganization project recognized the tense situation and suspended plans to implement
land management programs.  In several neighboring villages, however, land conflicts resulted
in violence and murder.  Local and regional government has been very aware of the tensions
over land and the great potential for conflict as land becomes scarcer.  There have been many
attempts to officially mediate conflicts, particularly between Bwa and Mossi farmers.  The
highest official of the province, the Haut Commissaire, visited several of the study villages to
discuss issues of violence and land with local people.
6.  CONCLUSION
Debates on the causes of degradation being population growth, or culture, or tenure
insecurity, and over whether degradation is in fact taking place, and of the causes of
intensification and investments in sustaining soil quality, are the basis for competing
environmental ‘narratives’ that shape policy and politics.  These narratives operate at local,
national and international levels.  Furthermore, these narratives have material implications for
residents in the region.  Organizations such as the World Bank and Caisse Française are
attempting to alter local institutions for land management through Gestion des Terroirs
programs.
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This paper has argued for a more nuanced version of the intensification narrative and
the inappropriateness of the degradation narrative.  Three villages in southwestern Burkina--
Sara, and Dimikuy and Dohoun-- differ greatly in availability of arable land.  Farmers in Sara
speak gravely of land shortage.  They complain that they no longer have fallow land.  Yet this
population pressure, as in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, does not appear to be leading to
unsustainable farm practices.  Instead, Sara villagers, and wealthier villagers in Dohoun and
Dimikuy, appear to be well on their way to having permanent fields.  They leave large
numbers of trees on their fields, and they use fertilizer and manure frequently.  In accordance
with other research on intensification in sub-Saharan Africa, population is not the sole variable
that has led to higher input use; intensification is closely connected to other changes in policy,
credit, markets and services which have developed simultaneously with population increases. 
Moreover, Mossi farmers do not degrade their resource base more than local Bwa.  If
anything, the direction is reversed, with Mossi using more  manure.  Mossi also leave just as
many trees on their fields as Bwa farmers.  
Finally, this paper argues that tenure status matters little in a farmers’ decision to
invest in soil quality.  If anything, Mossi farmers, who generally have the most insecure land
tenure and fear that land will be taken away from them, invest in soil quality to secure access
to land.  They are, through their investments, improving tenure security.  Rights to land
become stronger the longer an individual can farm a plot of land.
Unfortunately, these tenure-building strategies of intensification are not distributionally
neutral.  Building individual rights means appropriating community rights (Berry 1997), and
building individual rights requires some financial wherewithal.  Those farmers less able to
adopt the tenure-building strategies are increasingly left out of the process.  Their claims to
land become more tentative.
What policy implications does this study hold?  The problem in Burkina lies in an
effective policy of neglect.  Because the government intervenes only lightly in the tenure
terrain, and when it does intervene it is usually through the indirect arm of donor-funded
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projects that lack institutional depth and legitimacy, local processes determine outcomes.  In
the scenario we have described, wealthier farmers intensify, cultivate continuously, and build
tenure rights.  Poorer farmers are unable to maintain their property rights.  Land tenure issues
increasingly become the sites of ethnic conflict.  Governments try to settle conflicts with
mediation, but because local farmers in Burkina, as in other regions of Africa, realize that the
government has very little desire to enforce outcomes, one way of assuring success is by
presenting local authorities with a fait accompli (Moore 1998; Lavigne Delville 2000).  It is an
interesting contradiction that in Burkina even though the state is nominally in control of
agricultural land (the Agrarian and Land Reform of 1984 declared that land belonged to the
state) it is very hesitant to use its power in settling land disputes.  In many instances in
Burkina, villagers have gone directly against government will by taking action, creating facts
on the ground and in general succeeding with that strategy.  This has lain the foundation for
greater uncertainty, unilateral action and ultimately conflict on the village level.  
From a distributional perspective, low-cost interventions to assure tenure rights of
poorer farmers must be developed.  First, if farmers are investing in soil quality to build rights
to land, then government efforts should be geared towards ensuring equitable access to
already available credit.  Farmers grow a range of crops that could benefit from increased
input use, but unless a farmer is tied into the cotton credit and marketing system, these inputs
are difficult to obtain.  Second, some measures that recognize the growing individual control
over land must be devised.  In much of Africa, attempts to formalize tenure relations have
either created greater tenure uncertainty or have failed because of the inability of resource
poor states to effectively monitor land systems.  Several authors have advocated adopting
incremental or contractual approaches to tenure formalization.  Lavigne-Delville (2000: 120-
121) suggests one simple low-cost method for formalizing tenure relations would be to
document land transactions, ensuring “that the person transferring the rights has the power to
do so and by specifying the content of the transaction”.  These might be used in cases where
decisions could be contested, land that is borrowed by migrants, for example.  Gradually, the
‘paper trail’ for land becomes substantial enough to facilitate the emergence of more efficient
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markets for land transfer and land collateralization.  At that point land becomes valuable
enough that private parties will be willing to support the cost of more substantial verification
and enforcement of tenure rights.  Third, the government needs to devise mechanisms that
allow it to credibly commit to decisions regarding land use that follow impartial and accessible
procedures.  Informal mediation by its nature favors wealthier farmers, in part because of its
bias to ratifying the status quo.  Again following an incremental approach, certain narrow
categories of land disputes might be automatically assigned to specialized government
bureaucrats or courts, with appeals handled by a provincial body, with decision-making
power by other authorities (formal or informal) expressly prohibited.  The immediate, and
very basic, priority is to establish sustainable and incentive-compatible structures to ensure
detailed record-keeping.  At present it is in the interest of most low-level government
bureaucrats to keep discussions strictly verbal, as this allows positions to be shifted as power
balances fluctuate.  That situation is, of course, inimical to longer term intensification, and to
protection of rights for the poor and marginalized.
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1. In past and present-day Burkina , migration has been an important strategy of those
escaping both short-term and long-term economic crises.  International migration has been
extremely important; an estimated 1-2 million migrants were leaving for the neighboring
countries of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana each year (Cordell et al. 1996).  Migration to these
wealthier countries south of Burkina  has tended to be circular; migrants, mostly Mossi,
returned after a year or two and invested their income in their natal villages or regions. 
Internal migration, except for rural-urban migration and movements of transhumant
populations, remained insignificant until the droughts of  1970s and 1980s which, along with
growing population in the central Mossi region, spurred a large-scale migration into the
southern and western regions of the country.  Many Mossi migrated to the less drought prone
and land-abundant areas in the south and southwest.  Unlike international migrants, migrants
within Burkina  did not return to their home villages, but instead settled permanently in their
new communities, in the process creating a migratory chain for hometown kith and kin who
followed the trail of opportunity to the agricultural regions of the southwest.
2.Gray (1999) notes in a restudy of soil quality in Dohoun that there has been very little
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         Table 1: Household means from three village sample
                                                 Three villages            Dimikuy               Dohoun                 Sara
                                                 Mossi       Bwa       Mossi       Bwa       Mossi       Bwa       Mossi       Bw
                   (n=53)     (n=53)
         Age of head                             51.17      44.38     49.28      45.38      57.78      45.00      46.18      43.05a  
         # of adult men                           2.40       2.36       2.11       2.56       3.00       2.53       2.06       2.05
         # of adult women                         2.60       2.21       2.94       3.75       3.22       1.47       1.59       1.60
         Ratio of workers to consumers            0.54       0.53       0.47       0.58       0.55       0.53       0.62       0.48
         Years in village (for migrants)         18.69          .      15.29          .      13.06          .      28.06          .
         Years of schooling                       2.08       6.00     2.56       3.88       0.33       4.59       3.41       8.90a    
         Value of livestock (100,000 CFA)         9.00       3.14    13.07       4.51       7.56       2.09       6.21       2.94b a    
         Housing index                            0.94       1.19       1.38       1.47          .       1.08       0.50       1.05c
         Assets                                   2.35       2.18       4.14       3.48       3.67       2.97       3.14       3.04d
         Own oxen?                                0.64       0.62       0.78       0.75       0.33       0.47       0.82       0.65
         Number of oxen, if own                   3.15       2.70       3.57       2.92       3.33       2.63       2.64       2.54
         Number of carts                          0.45       0.57       0.61       0.69       0.17       0.41       0.59       0.60
         Number of plows                          0.87       0.85       1.17       1.00       0.39       0.71       1.06       0.85
         Total area cultivated (hec.)             6.15       5.81       8.07       8.08       4.97       5.00       5.47       4.80
         Number of fields                         2.04       1.53     1.78       1.44       1.94       1.06       2.41       2.00a    
 Source: Author survey, 1996.
 Number of households = 106
 Indicates that means of ethnic groups different at 5% level, for whole sample  a
 Value of animals using market prices.b
 Housing index is sum of five 0-1 indicators of housing investmentc
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 Assets index is computed as .25*(# of carts + # of plows)) + (# of oxen) + 4*(# of tractors)d
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Table 2: Population Density of Sara, Dimikuy and Dohoun 
Village (total land area)  (arable land area)




       
     Source: Author survey 1996
30
    Table 3: Differences in agricultural practices according to village, characteristics of field, ethnicity
                                           Manure per            Fertilizer              Manure
                                           hectare if            per ha. if   Years       from    # of trees  Any anti-    Any
                                 Applied    applied    Applied    applied   since last corralled     per      erosion   observable
                                  manure?   (sacks)   fertilizer? (sacks)     fallow    animals?   hectare   investment? erosion?
            Whole sample           0.20      16.41       0.64       1.83      11.46       0.22      14.65       0.13       0.18
            Village
            Dimikuy                0.29      29.59       0.67       1.42      10.03       0.27      12.76       0.06       0.08
            Dohoun                 0.18       4.75       0.57       1.22      11.24       0.38      12.39       0.29       0.19
            Sara                   0.27      21.12       0.88       2.63      15.85       0.11      17.60       0.14       0.24
            Field characteristics
            near field             0.46      21.86       0.70       1.84      14.53       0.17      10.46       0.16       0.13
            farfield               0.06      9.42       0.74       1.91      12.17       0.26      17.30      0.16       0.23a  a  
            no slope               0.22      17.03       0.68       2.06      10.63       0.21      14.22       0.10       0.09
            slope                  0.16      15.33       0.43      1.17      14.93       0.24      19.70       0.25       0.57a  a  
            Ethnicity
            Bwa                    0.15      37.57       0.83       2.34      12.00       0.30      14.23       0.11       0.09
            Mossi                  0.31      11.74      0.65      1.55      13.42       0.18     15.23       0.19       0.25a  a  a  a  a  
    Source: Author survey, 1996.
    Indicates that means different at 5% levela
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                            Table 4:  Tenure status of fields (proportions of total number of fields, by ethnic group)                         
                                                                     ALL        Dimikuy       Dohoun        Sara
                              Bwa
                           Inherited from lineage                    0.43         0.54         0.50         0.33
                           Inherited from outside lineage            0.07         0.00         0.00         0.15
                           Borrowed from lineage                     0.04         0.04         0.06         0.03
                           Borrowed from outside lineage             0.46         0.42         0.44         0.49 
                                 Mossi
                           Inherited from outside lineage            0.02         0.00         0.00         0.05
                           Borrowed from a tuteur                    0.43         0.26         0.59         0.42
                           Borrowed from Bwa                         0.55         0.74         0.41         0.52
                           No tiin of grain given                    0.23         0.03         0.31         0.32
                           One tiin of grain given                   0.35         0.26         0.17         0.56
                           Two tiin of grain given                   0.42         0.71         0.51         0.12
            Source: Author survey, 1996.
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          Table 5: Multivariate analyses of soil fertility management                                   
                                                                   Years cultivated                                                                      Anti-erosion
                       Sacks of manure per  Sacks of fertilizer   since last fallow   Animals corralled on  Trees per hectare   Erosion observed to   technique used on
                         hectare (Tobit)    per hectare (Tobit)         (OLS)           field? (Probit)           (OLS)         be problem? (Probit)   field? (Probit)
                                std.                 std.                 std.                 std.                 std.                 std.                 std.
                        coeff. error         coeff. error         coeff. error         coeff. error         coeff. error         coeff. error         coeff. error      
          VARIABLE
          moborbwa      16.59   9.68*        -0.72   0.47          3.06   1.95         -0.18   0.06**       -0.71   2.24          0.06   0.10          0.02   0.07      
          mborfrer      11.86  10.30         -1.11   0.50**        3.36   1.92*        -0.11   0.07          1.94   2.75          0.36   0.16***       0.09   0.09      
          bwabor         6.63  10.23         -0.03   0.48          2.73   1.97          0.01   0.08         -0.89   2.45          0.05   0.11         -0.05   0.07      
          dimikuy       11.93  12.17         -0.76   0.55         -4.98   2.01**       -0.21   0.07**        3.03   2.16         -0.00   0.11         -0.22   0.07***   
          sara          12.28  11.62          1.44   0.53***       1.48   2.14         -0.35   0.08***       6.89   2.73**        0.17   0.10*        -0.23   0.09**    
          farfield     -26.95   7.41***       0.48   0.37         -2.87   1.87         -0.01   0.07          5.87   1.78***       0.17   0.05***      -0.06   0.06      
          slopdum       11.82   9.16         -1.40   0.46***      -0.67   1.96         -0.00   0.09          6.67   2.42***       0.60   0.11***       0.24   0.10***   
          stony          6.06   9.72         -0.01   0.53         -2.99   2.16          0.03   0.10          2.49   2.77         -0.02   0.09         -0.25   0.10**    
          silty        -10.82  10.47          0.28   0.48         -4.61   2.18**       -0.24   0.10**        0.76   2.65          0.19   0.08**       -0.10   0.09      
          assets         4.40   1.82**        0.33   0.09***       1.18   0.44***       0.05   0.02***      -0.65   0.41          0.03   0.01**        0.02   0.01*     
34
          constant     -39.23  15.52**        0.70   0.70         12.68   2.76***                            5.25   3.59                     
                          n=151               n=151                n=154                 n=114               n=156                n=156                n=156
     pseudo R =.10          pseudo R =.10         R =.09 pseudo R = .26           R =.27           pseudo R = .26         pseudo R =2 2 2 2 2 2 2
.26   
     log L = -158.16       log L = -158.16                             log L = -267.86
        log L = -45.76        log L = -52.36
Source: Author survey, 1996.
Note: All standard errors are robust standard errors except for Tobit; In probit models coefficients are marginal 
effects for continuous variables, and effect on probability of varying dummy variable from 0 to 1(thus no constant
term is included in probit model).
* is significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
